Anthony Diaz (![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png)
saavedra77) wrote2004-03-22 12:48 pm
saavedra77) wrote2004-03-22 12:48 pm
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Insider's View #2
Perhaps the most scathing "insiders'" accounts of the Bush Administration's prewar thinking and behavior have come from former U.S. officials such as Joe Wilson, Paul O'Neil, & Richard Clarke:
First it was former U.S. Ambassador Joe Wilson, who in a July 6, 2003 New York Times Op/Ed criticized the Administration's repeated claim that Iraq had sought to buy processed uranium in Africa. Wilson had personally investigated this claim on behalf of the U.S. government in early 2002 and had reported to CIA and State Department officials that the story was unfounded. Despite Wilson's report, the Administration continued to cite the alleged uranium purchases--most prominently in the president's 2003 State of the Union address--leading Wilson to charge that intelligence had been "manipulated" to build a case for war.
Next it was former Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neil, who claimed that members of Bush's National Security Council started talking about an invasion of Iraq long before 9/11--in fact, on the day after Bush was inaugurated. O'Neil was struck that the Council never discussed the rationale for such an invasion, only "finding a way to do it."
Then it was U.S. chief weapons inspector Dr. David Kay, who after six months of "intense" searching concluded that the Iraqis had not possessed any chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons stockpiles, before the war. Reflecting on how prewar intelligence could have been so wrong about Iraq's supposed weapons, Kay has recently admitted that his own and other officials' prewar views may have been shaped more by assumptions than information.
And now it's Bush's former Counterterrorism Coordinator Richard Clarke. Interviewed for the March 21, 2004 broadcast of CBS' "60 Minutes" Clarke suggested that the president initially wanted to link the 9/11 hijackings to Iraq--and lost his temper when told that the intelligence agencies could find no such link.
First it was former U.S. Ambassador Joe Wilson, who in a July 6, 2003 New York Times Op/Ed criticized the Administration's repeated claim that Iraq had sought to buy processed uranium in Africa. Wilson had personally investigated this claim on behalf of the U.S. government in early 2002 and had reported to CIA and State Department officials that the story was unfounded. Despite Wilson's report, the Administration continued to cite the alleged uranium purchases--most prominently in the president's 2003 State of the Union address--leading Wilson to charge that intelligence had been "manipulated" to build a case for war.
Next it was former Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neil, who claimed that members of Bush's National Security Council started talking about an invasion of Iraq long before 9/11--in fact, on the day after Bush was inaugurated. O'Neil was struck that the Council never discussed the rationale for such an invasion, only "finding a way to do it."
Then it was U.S. chief weapons inspector Dr. David Kay, who after six months of "intense" searching concluded that the Iraqis had not possessed any chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons stockpiles, before the war. Reflecting on how prewar intelligence could have been so wrong about Iraq's supposed weapons, Kay has recently admitted that his own and other officials' prewar views may have been shaped more by assumptions than information.
And now it's Bush's former Counterterrorism Coordinator Richard Clarke. Interviewed for the March 21, 2004 broadcast of CBS' "60 Minutes" Clarke suggested that the president initially wanted to link the 9/11 hijackings to Iraq--and lost his temper when told that the intelligence agencies could find no such link.