Deconstructing the Memo
Apr. 14th, 2004 06:50 pm![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png){kind=small}
saavedra77The Bush Administration has described the August 6, 2001 Presidential Daily Briefing memo (PDB) that was declassified this weekend as a primarily "historical" document providing no real "actionable intelligence" that could have helped prevent 9/11.
Let’s examine that characterization ….
Entitled "Bin Ladin Determined to Strike in US," the PDB directly addresses the threat of a future al Qaeda attack inside the U.S.
Reviewing both past al Qaeda activities and current intelligence, the PDB affirms that such a threat exists: Bin Ladin had personally expressed a desire to "bring the fighting to America," "to retaliate in Washington"; moreover, the memo notes that senior al Qaeda planner Abu Zubaydah had told millennium bomber Ahmed Ressam that Zubaydah was "planning his own US attack."
The PDB also points out that al Qaeda's membership in 2001 included not only past visitors to but current residents and citizens of the US. The implication is clearly that such persons would be well positioned to "bring the fighting to America," if they sought to act on the group's stated desires and plans. Still more ominously, the memo notes that "a Bin Ladin cell in New York was recruiting Muslim-American youth for attacks."
Above all, the memo characterizes Bin Ladin as "determined," his organization as undeterred "by setbacks," and oriented toward the long-term (al Qaeda "prepares operations years in advance").
In other words, the August 6 PDB describes al Qaeda's intention and capability to conduct an attack in the US. In light of which, the White House’s characterization of the PDB’s contents as largely "historical" seems misleading, at best.
On the other hand, the lack of specific threat information does raise the question of how "actionable" these warnings are: The PDB mentions suspected "preparations for hijackings or other types of attacks" and "approximately 70" ongoing, al-Qaeda-related FBI field investigations in the US, but gives few details. (The one specific case that it does mention appears to have been a false lead: the suspected "recent surveillance of federal buildings in New York" may have been nothing more than a couple of Yemeni tourists taking pictures.)
Unmentioned in the memo are the few real leads that the FBI and CIA had about the impending attack--crucially:
1. NSA & CIA intelligence about future hijackers Khalid al-Midhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi;
2. The FBI’s so-called "Phoenix memo," warning of suspicious activities at U.S. flight schools;
3. Similar concerns raised by FBI agents in Minnesota regarding inexperienced would-be jet-pilot Zacarias Moussaoui.
To the extent that US authorities could have done anything to prevent 9/11, these appear to have been the key opportunities. But, as is now widely acknowledged, the CIA and FBI failed to "connect the dots": The CIA neglected to inform the INS or FBI about al-Midhar and al-Hazmi until after the two men had already spent several months living in the US (at one point renting an apartment from a figure in the San Diego Muslim community who also happend to be an FBI informant!). And while the concerns of FBI field agents in Arizona and Minnesota came to the attention of the Bureau’s Radical Fundamentalist Task Force, they were never acted upon. And, needless to say, none of this ever rose to the level of a Presidential Daily Briefing ...
Let’s examine that characterization ….
Entitled "Bin Ladin Determined to Strike in US," the PDB directly addresses the threat of a future al Qaeda attack inside the U.S.
Reviewing both past al Qaeda activities and current intelligence, the PDB affirms that such a threat exists: Bin Ladin had personally expressed a desire to "bring the fighting to America," "to retaliate in Washington"; moreover, the memo notes that senior al Qaeda planner Abu Zubaydah had told millennium bomber Ahmed Ressam that Zubaydah was "planning his own US attack."
The PDB also points out that al Qaeda's membership in 2001 included not only past visitors to but current residents and citizens of the US. The implication is clearly that such persons would be well positioned to "bring the fighting to America," if they sought to act on the group's stated desires and plans. Still more ominously, the memo notes that "a Bin Ladin cell in New York was recruiting Muslim-American youth for attacks."
Above all, the memo characterizes Bin Ladin as "determined," his organization as undeterred "by setbacks," and oriented toward the long-term (al Qaeda "prepares operations years in advance").
In other words, the August 6 PDB describes al Qaeda's intention and capability to conduct an attack in the US. In light of which, the White House’s characterization of the PDB’s contents as largely "historical" seems misleading, at best.
On the other hand, the lack of specific threat information does raise the question of how "actionable" these warnings are: The PDB mentions suspected "preparations for hijackings or other types of attacks" and "approximately 70" ongoing, al-Qaeda-related FBI field investigations in the US, but gives few details. (The one specific case that it does mention appears to have been a false lead: the suspected "recent surveillance of federal buildings in New York" may have been nothing more than a couple of Yemeni tourists taking pictures.)
Unmentioned in the memo are the few real leads that the FBI and CIA had about the impending attack--crucially:
1. NSA & CIA intelligence about future hijackers Khalid al-Midhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi;
2. The FBI’s so-called "Phoenix memo," warning of suspicious activities at U.S. flight schools;
3. Similar concerns raised by FBI agents in Minnesota regarding inexperienced would-be jet-pilot Zacarias Moussaoui.
To the extent that US authorities could have done anything to prevent 9/11, these appear to have been the key opportunities. But, as is now widely acknowledged, the CIA and FBI failed to "connect the dots": The CIA neglected to inform the INS or FBI about al-Midhar and al-Hazmi until after the two men had already spent several months living in the US (at one point renting an apartment from a figure in the San Diego Muslim community who also happend to be an FBI informant!). And while the concerns of FBI field agents in Arizona and Minnesota came to the attention of the Bureau’s Radical Fundamentalist Task Force, they were never acted upon. And, needless to say, none of this ever rose to the level of a Presidential Daily Briefing ...
